marble wrote: what puzzles me is if he is truly guilty and has pled innocent then god would know that and according to his sins he goes to hell. Opens all sorts of questions - does he really believe in God or can he just absolve his sins in church and face the consequences of the earthy trial in heaven

Isn't he good to go, to heaven, if he confesses?

Just because a person is found guilty of a crime it does mean they actually committed the crime.

djebel wrote: Just because a person is found guilty of a crime it does mean they actually committed the crime.

Tlazolteotl wrote: Probably a good chance of getting off on appeal before a panel of judges - seems to be plenty of reasonable doubt. Don't know if he's guilty. Could be but the Pell in this case would have to have been wildly impetuous. Pell doesn't seem like the wildly impetuous type.

That's what Richter said - he'd have to be a "madman" to do what the guy said he did in those circumstances. It's possible, but highly improbable.

The key thing for me at this point is that, out of all of the stuff thrown at him, only one thing went far enough down the line of the legal process for a jury to make a decision on. I agree Pell/Richter probably made the decision to lift the suppression order, which would have had to stand until the appeal process was over.

Still more to come than most people would understand. If he's guilty of what the guy said he did, no prison experience is bad enough for him. I still personally doubt it, even though I never liked him as a person. Geez even Frank Brennan SJ has expressed shock. I guess he was the Jesuit at court mentioned in some articles. Whatever happens, the RC church in Oz has been dealt a death blow. Horrible day for aussie Catholics.

It will be interesting to see what the grounds for the appeal are, you dont like the result is not grounds. Also jury decisions are not easily overturned.

20.4.1.1 - Verdicts that are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence

1. To find that a verdict is unreasonable or unsupportable by the evidence, the court must undertake its own independent evaluation of the evidence and determine, as a question of fact, whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is, the court may only allow an appeal on this basis when the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt and it is not sufficient to show that the jury might have had a reasonable doubt. The court does not need to affirmatively find that the accused is innocent. A court may allow an appeal on this basis even if, as a matter of law, the verdict was open on the evidence (M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63; Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439; Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250; [1998] HCA 68; R v Haseloff [1998] 4 VR 359; MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; [1984] HCA 7; Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657; [1983] HCA 42; Raspor v R (1958) 99 CLR 346; Davies & Cody v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; [2007] HCA 30. Compare Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51)
2. The principles governing this ground of appeal were summarised as follows in R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75:
   1. The court of criminal appeal must ask itself whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.
   2. In considering that question, the appeal court must bear in mind that the jury has the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence and has had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses.
   3. In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced.
   4. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred.
3. In many cases, a verdict challenged under s276(1)(a) will be described as "unsafe or unsatisfactory". While this language is imprecise and may conceal whether the appeal is upheld under s276(1)(a) or s276(1)(c), it currently stands as an acceptable formulation of the statutory test, which may fall within either ground, depending on the nature of the evidence (MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53 per McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. See also M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63; Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250; [1998] HCA 68; Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106; [1998] HCA 21).
4. In assessing whether a verdict is unsafe or unreasonable, the court recognises that the jury had the benefit of seeing the witnesses and is primarily responsible for determining guilt or innocence. This ground of appeal does not allow a party to substitute trial by a court of appeal for trial by jury (M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63; Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439).
5. In M v R, the majority judgment (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ) explained how the court may give effect to the jury’s advantage in seeing the witnesses:

   In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence (M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 494; [1994] HCA 63).

6. When the jury rejects a defence of mental impairment, an appellant relying on this ground must show that, on the evidence at the trial, a reasonable jury must have found the defence established. This will often be a very different question to the usual case, where the question is whether a reasonable jury could be satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (R v Fitchett (2009) 23 VR 91; [2009] VSCA 150; M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63).
7. This ground of appeal is distinct from an argument that the verdicts are inconsistent. An acquittal on one charge will usually not be relevant to an argument that the verdicts are unsafe, unless the acquittal demonstrates that the verdicts are inconsistent. Complaints about inconsistent verdicts should be made through a discrete and explicit appeal ground (MG v R (2010) 29 VR 305; [2010] VSCA 97).
8. In assessing the strength of the evidence, there are significant limitations on the ability of the court to draw inferences from the accused’s failure to give evidence. An appellate court is bound by the same restrictions on drawing inferences from silence as a jury (for information on those restrictions, see Chapter 4.10.2.1 of the Victorian Criminal Charge Book). The limited circumstances in which an appellate court can draw inferences from the accused’s silence at trial will not exist in a sexual assault case, where there is no matter that lies solely within the accused’s knowledge and instead the case depends on the jury accepting the evidence of the complainant (MA v R [2012] VSCA 214; ADG v R [2011] VSCA 430).

Probably on legal advice because he performed so poorly on the stand during the Royal Commission.

Good post Stayer.

rusty nails wrote: These are not the only two accusers, they are the only 2 left standing. Remember,there was another trial scheduled to start after this one. Look at his history, backed Ridsdale, put through many many accusers of other priests through hell, to stop them getting justice. He is a hypocrite to continue to be in the clergy, he has zero understanding of Christian behaviour.

You need to know more about corruption in the RC church, Rusty. "Christian behaviour" is rare. Just ask Pope Frankie.

The usual law and order crusaders Andrew Bolt Miranda Devine et al, who obsessively deride courts for not going hard enough on criminals, particularly their pet hates, poor people, youth and minorities, are today calling for the rejection of the finding of 12 Australians who actually sat through the testimony of the accuser including a full day of cross examination by Pell's very expensive barrister. Devine is accusing police of ''hunting Catholics'' 

I'd like to see the testimony of the choir master, because the way Richter is telling it, the choir master testified that there is no way choir boys could run loose unnoticed at the time of the alleged incident.

more accurate number of alleged accusers should come out with the release of the suppressed RC findings Whale.

Whale wrote: I detest paedos and of course did not hear the evidence but I cannot fathom how Pell was found guilty. I think the verdict had a lot to do with his arrogance and unlikeability and that is wrong uncorroborated evidence from 2 "victims" Paedos have hundreds of victims, only 2 testified, some may have dropped out but not hordes Paedos groom their victims, look for vulnerability, Pell encountered the boys for the first time I think, unbelievable that he would sexually abuse them under those circumstances Too public I have no time for Pell and his cover ups but that was not what he was tried for.

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